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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELA MAE SPRATLING PARR, DOROTHY 
DEANE SPRATLING LOVE, CAROL BETH 
SPRATLING HENSON, and COLEEN 




ZION'S FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a corpo-
ration, successor to Utah Savings & Trust 
Company, a corporation, administrator of the 
estate of George Albert Steadman, deceased, 
also known as George A. Steadman, and EL-
VINA S. STEADMAN, 
Defendants, 





STATEMENT OF TJIE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to a piece of land lo~ 
cated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment 
against all defendants, which motion was contested by 
intervenors-appellants. The Court granted plaintiffs' 
motion and entered its findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and decree. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek reversal of the order granting a 
motion for summary judgment and the entry of the de-
cree thereon. 
STAT'El\1EN·T OF FACTS 
On the 2.2nd day of April, 1929, the piece of property 
involved in this action was deeded to Walter Steadman 
and sons by Abraham S. 1\fishkind and Sadie S. Mishkind, 
his wife. (p. 6 of Exhibit 1) On the 27th day of January, 
1944, Walter Steadman transferred the property to his 
wife, Edith E. Steadman. (p. 20 of Exhibit 1) On Janu-
ary 3, 1945, Edith E. Steadman, widow of Walter Stead-
man, transferred the property to William Parley Sprat-
ling and Amelia Daisy Spratling, his wife. (p. 21 of Ex-
hibit 1) On February 1, 1956, William Spratling and his 
wife transferred the property to their daughters, the 
plaintiffs in the above action. (p. 26 of Exhibit 1.) 
George Albert Steadman, the son of Walter Stead-
man, died February 14, 1941. (R. 41). At the time of his 
death Edith Steadman, his daughter, was a minor, age 
1, and Sheldon Steadman, his son, was a minor, age 5. 
Utah Savings and Trust Con1pany, now knovm as 
Zions First National Bank, was on the 30th day of April, 
1941, appointed as administrator of the estate of George 
Albert Steachnan (R. 8); and on the 23rd day of Decem-
ber, 1942, the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt La:ke County, ente·red its decree of distribution of 
the assets of the estate of George Albert Steadman, de-
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ceased. (R. 41-4:3) At the ti1ne of the entry of said decree 
Sheldon Steadn1an was six years of age and Edith Ste·ad-
Inan was two years of age. (R. 41) At said time the Utah 
Savings and Trust Company was the duly appointed 
and qualified guardian of the e~states of the minor chil-
dren of George Albert Steadman. (R. 47) The property 
described in the decree of distribution above referred to, 
with any and all other property or estate whatever be-
longing to said deceased or in or to which he or his estate 
n1ay have any interest not now known or which may 
hereafter be discovered, was distributed as follows: 
To Elvina S. Stead1nan, surviving wife of said 
deceased, 1/3 thereof in her own right plus 
the share assigned to her by said Deilis Albert 
Steadman of 1/12, making in all an undivided 
5/12 of said estate. 
To Utah Savings and ·Trust Company, a corpora-
tion as guardian of the estate of said seven 
minor children of the deceased, Ralph J. Stead-
man, Junior H. Steadman, De wain W. Stead-
man, Virgil Steadman, Mary Blanche Stead-
man, Sheldon Steadman and Edith Steadman 
(each being entitled to receive an undivided 
1/12 of said estate) an undivided 
7/12 of said estate. (R. 43) 
The plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest have 
been in possession of t'he real property continuously since 
1945 (R. 25) and have paid the taxes on said property 
each year since that time and before the same became de-
linquent. (R. 23-24) 
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Plaintiffs filed their con1plaint to quiet title to the 
real estate in question and made as parties Zions First 
National Bank, administrator of the estate of George 
Albert Steadman, and Elvina S. Steadman, his widow. 
(R.l-3) 
Respondents, Edith Steadman Green and Sheldon 
Steadman, filed a motion for intervention, answer to 
plaintiffs' complaint and a counterclaim against plaintiffs 
wherein they claimed that they had an interest in the 
property as children of George Albert Steadman and that 
seven years had not elapsed since they attained their 
majority. (R. 4-9) 
Plaintiffs in answer to the counterclaim filed by 
intervenors alleged that George Steadman had no inter-
est in the property, that the Statute of Limitations, name-
ly 78-12-6, 78-12-8, 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
commenced to run against intervenors' guardian, namely 
Utah Savings and Trust Company, in January, 1945, and 
continued until the discharge of said guardian on Sep-
tember 11, 1957, and that seven years had passed. (R. 10-
12) 
Zions First National Bank Association, successor to 
Utah Savings and T·rust Company as administrator of 
the estate of George Albert Steadman, filed a disclaimer. 
(R. 13-15) 
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that the Statute of Limitations 
had run in favor of plaintiffs and their predecessors 
and against the legally appointed guardian of intervenors 
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and that the Statute of Lilnitations had therefore run 
against intervenors and there is no defense to the action. 
rrhe nlotion is based upon the pleadings, records and files 
in this action and the files in the Probate Division of 
the Court as to the guardianship of said intervenors. ( R. 
19) 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was grant-
ed, and the Court made and entered its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree. (R. 31-36) 
ARGU~1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WILL NOT RUN 
AGAINST A MINOR EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN 
APPOINTED A GENERAL GUARDIAN FOR THE MINOR, 
AND THE COURT ERRED !IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S' 
MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN ENTERING 
ITS FINDINGS OF F kCT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DE:CRE'E. 
The Statute of Limitations, 78-12-6, 78-12-8, 78-12-12, 
Utah ·Code Annotated, 1953, or any other statute affecting 
the right or possession to real property will not operate 
against a person under the age of majority, as Section 
78-12-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides : 
"78-12-21. Disabilities enumerated. - ·Time of 
not reckoned. - If a person entitled to commence 
an action for the recovery of real property or for 
the recovery of the possession thereof, or to make 
any entry or defense, founded on the title to real 
property or to rents or services out of the same, 
is at the time such title shall first descent or ae-
crue, either: 
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(1) Under the age of majority; or, 
(2) Insane; or, 
( 3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in exeeu-
tion upon conviction of a criminal offense, for a 
term less than for life; 
T'he time during which such disability continues 
is not deemed any portion of the time in this 
article limited for the commencement of such ac-
tions or the making of such entry or defense.'' 
In the present case there is no dispute but that inter-
venors were minors at the time plaintiffs and their pre-
decessors in interest obtained title and that seven years 
have not run since intervenors, and each of them at-
tained their majority. 
This Court held in the case of Robbins v. Duggins, 
61 Utah 542,, 216 P. 232, that where an administrator 
is appointed and the right of action is in the administra-
tor, if the administrator is barred, the heirs will also 
be barred. The Court further held that upon. distribution 
of the property, the property distributed passed from 
the control of the administrator and that even though he 
may still remain in possession, he holds the property as 
an agent or bailee of the distributee and not as a re~pre­
sentative, and the Statute of Limitations will not run 
against the nrinor heir. 
In this case, Utah Savings and Trust Company distri-
buted the entire estate to those entitled thereto on the 
23rd day of Decmnher, 1942-two years before Walter 
Steadman attempted to transfer the property to his wife 
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and three years before his wife transferred it to plain-
tiffs or their predecessors in interest. 
Under the holding of the Robbtns v. Duggins case 
supra, the statute would not run against the administra-
tor of George Albert Steadman's estate. This brings 
us to the question of whether or not the Statute of Limita-
tions could run against the guardian of a minor and there-
by exclude the minor from his right to a cause of action 
or a defense to one. 
74-4-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as fol-
lows: 
''Property of intestate passes subject to probate 
proceedings. - The property, both real and per-
sonal, of one who dies without disposing of it by-
will passes to the heirs of the intestate, subject 
to the control of the court, and to the possession 
of administrator appointed by the court for the 
purpose of administration." 
Distribution to the guardian of a minor does not 
pass title to the guardian. 25 Am. Jttr., page 69, Sec. 107 
states: 
"Title to Property.- Legal title to the property 
of an infant or incompetent ward is in the ward, 
rather than in the guardian. The guardian has 
no beneficial title in the ward's estate, being mere-
ly the custodian and manager or conservator 
thereof. When a deed or mortgage is taken by a 
guardian for his ward, the title is regarded as 
being in the ward.'' 
Messengale v. Barnes ('Tex., 1937) 106 S.W. 2d 
368. 
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A cause of action covering property in a guardian-
ship estate is vested in the ward and not in the guardian. 
Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473 (July, 
1935). In the Rawson case the the complaint was brought 
in the name of Mary E. Rawson, as guardian of the~ estate 
of Clarence Hardy, an incompetent. ·The defendants de-
murred generally to the complaint on the ground that it 
did not state a cause of action in favor. of the plaintiff 
and against them, the contention being made that the 
action is one in favor of Mary E. Rawson, the matter 
reading 'as Guardian of the Estate of Clarence Hardy, 
an Incompetent,' being merely descriptio personae. The 
Court stated : 
"Since the complaint shows no cause of action in 
her but in her ward, it is argued, therefore, the 
complaint fails to state a cause of action in her 
favor. It is true that the correct way of bringing 
an action on behalf of a ward is to entitle it, 
'·Clarence Hardy by Mary E. Rawson, Guardian,' 
etc. ; but in this case under the pleadings and the 
stipulations entered into by the parties it is per-
fectly apparent that the suit was intended to be 
brought in behalf of the ward. In determining 
whether the person is suing ill his represootative 
or his individual capacity, the averments of the 
whole pleading should be considered." 
What is the distinction between the powers of an 
administrator and a guardian in connection with real 
property¥ Under Section 75-10-1, an administrator may 
sell any real property as well as personal property of the 
estate, provided, as set forth in 75-10-2, the sale is re-
ported to the court and confirmed by the court before title 
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passes. 75-10-3 provides in part that the administrator 
Inay sell any property of the estate without the order 
of the court at eithe-r public or private sale and without 
notice as he may determine, but must make return of 
such sale in all cases. A guardian's action is limited. See-
tion 75-13-32 provide'S in part that a guardian of property 
must safely keep the property of his ward. He must not 
permit any unnecessary waste or destruction of the real 
properrty, nor make any sale without the order of the 
court. 75-13-33 provides in part that the guardian may 
sell, mortgage, or lease the real estate upon obtaining an 
order of the court therefor, and as stated in 2·5 Am. J ur., 
page 70, Section 108 : 
"Under modern statutes, although he has exten-
sive powers over both a ward's realty and person-
alty, a guardian may not sell his ward's real estate 
except under order of court.'' 
Page 78, Section 124 provides : 
"It is, therefore, a firmly established general rule 
that a guardian has no authority to sell real estate 
of his ward without an order of court, in the ab-
sence of a statute expressly or by implication con-
ferring the power or authority otherwise conferred 
upon him, as by will." 
The distinction between the authority of an admini-
strator -and a guardian is clearly pointed out in the case 
of Aronson et .al v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav-
ings Assn. (Feb. 1937, Calif.), 65 P.2d 823. In this case 
a suit was brought by a minor for the conversion of stock. 
Sinee April 21, 1926, one or more persons have been 
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the duly appointed and acting general guardians of the 
persons and estates of the plaintiffs. Neither plaintiffs 
nor their guardians demanded of the bank that the certi-
ficates be issued to them. ·The court states : 
"In this rHspect we are asked to decide whether 
or not the running of the statutory period where 
there is a general guardian of a minor is a bar 
to a subsequent action by the minor. The primary 
contention of the defendant (respondent) is that 
the answer to the question is yes. We are of the 
view that the answer is no. 
In deciding the question we have before us the 
decision of the Supreme Court in denying a peti-
tion for hearing, aftHr the decision of the Appel-
late Court, in 11:aier v. Harbor Center Land Co., 
41 Cal. App. 79, 182 P. 345, 346. In that case, an 
action was brought by a guardian ad litem, on 
behalf of a minor, seeking to cancel a contract for 
the purchase of realty and to recover money paid 
under the contract. Respond8'llt contended that the 
statute of limitations barred the action because, 
prior to the appointment of the guardian ad litem, 
the minor had been represented by a general 
guardian who was at all times competent to sue 
in behalf of the minor. In denying the petition 
for hearing, the Supreme Court made the follow-
ing statement: 'Vv e desire, however, to say, in 
respect to the claims made under the statute of 
limitations, that in our opinion a complete answer 
to all such claims is to be found in section 352 
of our Code of Civil Procedure, in view of which 
the statute of limitations could not commence to 
rtm prior to the attain1nent of his majority by the 
minor.' Said section reads as follows: 'If a person 
entitled to bring an action mentioned in chapter 
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three of this title, he, at the time the cause of ac-
tion accrued, *** within the age of majority *** 
the time of such disability is not a part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action.' 
Defendant relies upon a sentence contained in Pat-
chett v. Pacific Coast Ry. Co., 100 Cal. 505, 509, 
35 P. 73, 75, to the effect that, when a cause of 
action 'vests in an executor, guardian, or trustee' 
who is unde·r no legal disability, the statute will 
commence to run, despite the disability of a minor 
heir, ward, or beneficiary. We cannot accept that 
language as the law of this case. In that case, the 
court was considering a trustee-beneficiary rela-
tionship solely. As we shall hereafter point out, 
a guardian-ward relationship is ,inherently diJffer-
ent. The question .as to a gu.ardian-ward re.lation-
ship was not involved in the oase. The insert~on 
of the word 'guar;diJan' was an inadvertence. In .any 
event, the word, so inserted, was mere obiter dic-
tum. 
It will be noted that respondent's contention is 
conditioned upon the vesting of the cause of action 
in the guardian. Our Supreme Oourt has conclud-
ed this argument also by holding that such cause 
of action vests in the ward and not in the guard-
ian. Dixon v. Gries (·Cardozo), 106 Cal. 506, 39 
P. 857. Since t'he right of action vests in the ward, 
it is not affected by the failure of his guardian 
to sue within the prescribed period, and the rule 
that when a right of action in a trustee· holding 
legal title becomes barred by limitation the right 
of the cestui que trust is also barred has no ap-
plication. Brown v. Midland Nat. Bank (·Tex. Civ. 
App.) 268 S.W. 226. 
The underlying reason for the difference in the 
rule as to the running of the statute, which is ap-
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plied to guardians, and that which is applied to 
executors, administrators, and truste-es, is clearly 
shown in the case of O'Shea v. Wilkinson, 95 Cal. 
454, 30 P. 588, 589, wherein the court states: 'An 
executor, administrator, or trustee of an express 
trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, 
may sue or be sued without joining with him the 
persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted, 
but a guardian does not belong to any of these 
classes. The guardian appears in the action sim-
ply to manage and take care of the interests of 
the infant when he (the infant) is a party to the 
action, and (the guardian) 'is no more a party to 
the action than the attorney, who appears in an 
action for one who has attained his majority, is a 
party to the suit in which he enters his appear-
ance.' Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 P. 418; 
Justice v. Ott, 87 Cal. 530, 25 P. 691." 
A further distinction lies in the fact that, although 
the guardian could have commenced the action 
within time and failed to do so, the ward, because 
of his incompetency, may have been-indeed is 
presumed to have been-tmable to impart to his 
guardian sufficient facts to disclose the existence 
of a cause of action, was under certain difficulties 
with regard to testifying about them, and by 
reason of the same disability may have been total-
ly unaware of his rights. The incompetent should 
not be penalized for his disabilities. To Ineet this 
situation, section 352 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and other similar statutes, tolling the stat-
ute of limitations during the continuance of the 
period of disability in certain specified cases, were 
enacted. 
The rule ''rlhich we have adopted as prevailing 
in this case has been generall~~ adopted in the other 
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jurisdictions of the United States. For a summa.ry 
of the cases on the subject see 6 A.L.R. 1690, en-
titled, 'II. Appointment of General Guardian for 
Infant.' (Emphasis added)." 
The above cases point out the. error contained in the 
statement in 6 A.L.R. on page 1693 where comment is 
made in connection with the case of D:ignan v. Nelson, 
26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936. In the Dignan case supra, there 
was both an administrator and a guardian and the prop-
erty in question had not been distributed by the adminis-
trator to the minor or the guardian, and the case should 
have been determined without mention of the fact that a 
guardian had been appointed. The statements in the 
Dignan v. Nelson case supra, and Jensen v. Jenkins, 24 
Utah 108, 66 P. 773, relating to a guardian were mere 
obiter dictum. 
Other cases covering the duty, rights and obligations 
of a guardian to a ward are tn re llansen.'s Guardianship, 
67 Utah 256, 247 P. 481 (192-6), vflolf v. U.S., 10 F. Supp. 
899 (1935), Sh.arnbegian v. U.S., 14 F. Supp. 93 (19·36), 
Aronson et al., v. Bank of America N. T. & B.A.~ et al., 
·Cal., 109 P.2d 1001 (1941) and Duliln v. Industrial Acci-
dent Co'mmission, et al., (Cal.) 149 P.2d 868 (1944). 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that neither the cause of 
action nor the title to the property in question ever vested 
in the guardian of appellants, and the Statute of Limit-
ations could not run until they reached their majority; 
that the lower court's deeision should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSSON 
.Attorneys for .Appellants 
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